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After Tarrying with the Negative
  
Freedom is unimaginable without negation.  The ability to negate the givens 
of its existence, whether they come from biology or from culture, provides 
the basis for the subject’s freedom.  Hegel, because he recognizes the central 
role that negation plays in the formation of subjectivity, is the philosopher 
of freedom.  As Hegel sees it, the subject doesn’t just play out the various 
determinations governing its actions but has the ability to determine itself, and 
this ability begins with the negation of what would otherwise determine the 
course that the subject pursues.  
 The role of negation in the subject’s freedom shows itself clearly in 
the relationship of a child with its parent.  The child experiences its freedom 
from the parent at the moment it defies the parent’s commands and acts 
contrary to what the parent dictates.  By transgressing the parent’s authority, 
the child reveals that this authority does not have a determinative power.  
Parental authority appears as less than authoritative in the face of the child’s 
disobedience, and this lack of authority serves as an indication of the child’s 
freedom.  
 And yet, this example reveals the essential problem of the association 
of freedom with negation.  As long as one negates an external authority, one 
remains on that authority’s terrain rather than on one’s own, which produces a 
very circumscribed notion of freedom.  The child can disobey, but it is still the 
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parent who establishes the rules that the child disobeys.  If freedom manifests 
itself only as rebellion or resistance, it isn’t freedom as such.  The child really 
becomes free when it moves past rebellion, lives on its own, and determines 
its own life.  In the same way, Hegel’s conception of freedom begins with 
negation, but it ends with the recognition that this negation must manifest itself 
in some positive form if the subject is to free itself completely from the external 
authority that it negates.  
 Hegel’s subject discovers its freedom not just through a single negation 
but through a series of negations.  In the “Self-Consciousness” section of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, this dynamic unfolds in its most straightforward 
fashion, which is why so many discussions of Hegel and freedom focus on it.  In 
the dialectic of the master and the servant, Hegel famously locates freedom 
on the side of the servant.  Even though servants must act according to the 
masters’ whims and have limited control over the direction of their own lives, 
servants have negativity on their side: they experience their own nothingness 
through the confrontation with the fear of death, and they experience the 
nothingness of the external world as they negate this world through work.  
 The fear that keeps a servant a servant and impedes servants from 
risking their lives in revolt is actually an emancipatory fear that reveals the 
insubstantiality of the servants’ own identity.  Hegel notes that the servant “has 
felt the fear of death, the absolute master.  In this experience, it is inwardly 
dissolved, has trembled in itself, and all that was fixed in it has shaken.  This 
pure universal movement, the absolute melting of everything permanent, is 
the simple essence of self-consciousness, the absolute negativity, the pure 
for-itself.”1  The negativity of an absolute fear emancipates servants from their 
attachment to themselves as substantial beings.  They grasp that everything 
about themselves that they assume to be fixed and stable can simply melt 
away, and this frees servants from a belief in their own identity as something 
determinative and authoritative.  
 According to Hegel, the same process occurs with the external world 
when servants work on it, which is what masters compel them to do.  Servants 
experience directly the malleability of the external world as they alter it by 
growing food, digging holes, or building houses.  Even though the world resists 
the servants’ actions to modify it, they are able to do so nonetheless, which has 
the effect of proving to them its insubstantiality and impermanence, even amid 
its intransigence.  For the servant, the external world’s malleability reveals that it 
cannot be authoritative.  
 The fearless masters who don’t labor have no contact with this 
negativity and thus enjoy the fruits of mastery in pure unfreedom.  Masters 
remain enthralled both to their own identity and to the external world.  Both 
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act as substantial authorities over the master that the master never has the 
opportunity to negate and to recognize their insubstantiality in the way that the 
servant does.  Through the phenomenology of servitude, Hegel illustrates that 
negativity is occasion for freedom.  But negativity does have the last word on 
the subject’s freedom.  
 As Hegel explores the contours of the servant’s negative freedom, 
its limitations become evident.  The problem with pure negativity is that it 
is incapable of becoming self-determining, which is why Hegel doesn’t end 
his exploration of freedom with the servant.  Paradoxically, pure negativity 
is never negative enough—Hegel calls it incomplete—to negate the external 
authority that determines it.  This becomes clear in the case of the stoic, the 
first figure of self-consciousness to appear after the master and servant in the 
Phenomenology.  The stoic locates its freedom in the domain of thought, which 
doesn’t suffer from the constraint of any external authority.  
 Stoicism negates the external world in order to grant pure thought an 
absolute value.  In thought, the stoic is free from all the determinations of the 
external world.  But when he probes this negative freedom of the stoic, Hegel 
finds that the determinations of the external world contaminate it.  Since 
stoicism provides no guidelines for what to think in one’s retreat from the world, 
the content of thought can only come from the world, which the stoic believes 
itself to have only a negative relation to.  The private thoughts of the stoic 
have their basis in the public world that the stoic rejects as valueless.  Through 
Hegel’s analysis, the negative freedom of stoicism shows itself as dependent on 
what it negates.  This is the paradigm for all philosophies of pure negativity or 
resistance.  
 As stoicism and the further developments of self-consciousness 
(skepticism and unhappy consciousness) reveal, the subject cannot content 
itself with negativity if it wants to recognize its freedom. The attempt to cling 
to negativity and conceive freedom in opposition produces a hysterical subject, 
a subject incapable of seeing how its rebellion actually feeds the authority that 
it challenges.  The stoic’s negation of the external world expands the power of 
external authority over the stoic, and this same process occurs whenever the 
subject refuses to recognize that freedom cannot remain purely negative (which 
is the case with both the servant and the stoic).
 What the insistence on negativity misses is that negativity always has a 
positive manifestation, whether the subject is aware of this or not.  All forms 
of freedom, even the freedom of pure negativity, have a positive correlate.  
This is the point at which the negation of external determinations becomes 
the subject’s self-determination.  This self-determination does consist in the 
subject’s ability to do anything at all or in the multiplicity of choices that the 
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subject has.  Instead, the subject’s self-determination is its self-limitation, and 
this self-limitation becomes the positive instantiation of freedom.  
 This becomes apparent in Hegel’s turn from self-consciousness to reason 
in the Phenomenology.  Whereas the forms of self-consciousness conceive the 
external world in opposition to self-consciousness, reason sees itself actualized 
in externality.  Rather than simply negating the external world and defining itself 
in opposition to it, reason justifies the form that the world takes and finds its 
freedom there in the midst of that form.
 For example, the subject’s decision to obey the speed limit while driving 
ceases to be capitulation to an external authority and becomes the expression 
of the subject’s own freedom.  In this act of obedience, the subject follows a law 
that its investment in the world has authorized.  As a result, this limit does not 
function purely as an external limit for the subject but as an internal one.  Or, to 
put it in Hegel’s terms, the Grenze (barrier) is also a Schranke (limit).  The free 
subject conceives the speed limit as its own self-limitation and thus experiences 
it as a sign of its own freedom, not as an constraint imposed externally.  Though 
clearly the subject did not establish speed limits itself, they make up the legal 
order that the subject does posit through its daily activity.  Recognizing a speed 
limit as a self-limitation might seem like a minute and even absurd gesture, but 
it is precisely the type of act that serves as an index of the subject’s freedom.  It 
is the unfree subject that experiences speed limits solely as a burden imposed 
by an external authority and that experiences its obedience as constraint that it 
would like to transgress.  
 Freedom is the recognition that the subject is the source of its own 
opposition, that its negation does not rely on any external authority but involves 
instead its own self-relation.  Of course, the subject must negate external figures 
of authority in order to discover its own freedom, but negation is also a self-
relation that these external negations obscure.  Once one conceives of the 
opposition as internal, one recognizes the essence of freedom.  As Hegel puts 
it in the Science of Logic, “the idea, because of the freedom which the concept 
has attained in it, also has the most stubborn opposition within it; its repose 
consists in the assurance and the certainty with which it eternally generates that 
opposition and eternally overcomes it, and in it rejoins itself.”2 The free subject 
recognizes that it doesn’t require the external authority that it opposes.  The 
opposition that animates freedom is ultimately an internal opposition.  
 As long as the theorist insists on pure negativity and resistance, what 
freedom looks like remains mystified.  Hegel articulates a philosophy of freedom 
unburdened of external opposition, a philosophy that requires moving beyond 
pure negativity and resistance.  From the perspective of resistance, one does 
not see that every authority ultimately suffers from the same inextirpable 
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contradiction that besets the subject itself.  One must theorize the positive 
form that freedom takes within the world, or else freedom remains a fetish that 
covers its absence.  
The Insubstantiality of the Other 
 For Hegel, the subject is free because there is no substantial Other that 
can function as a determinative authority for it.  The idea of a substance—an 
autonomous and independent entity—functioned as the basis for philosophical 
authority in every modern thinker prior to Hegel, and this hampered efforts at 
conceiving freedom.  As long as the subject believes that an autonomous and 
independent Other exists, it cannot truly conceive itself as free.  This is because 
the image of a substantial Other that knows its own desire and evinces perfect 
self-identity has a hypnotic effect on the subject’s desire.  This image captivates 
the subject and leads the subject to identify its desire with that of the supposed 
substantial authority.3 The subject posits the Other as substantial insofar as 
the Other remains obscure to it: absence of knowledge creates the illusion of 
substantiality that precludes the emergence of the subject’s freedom.  
 There is an inverse relationship between the obscurity of the Other 
and the freedom of the subject.  The subject interprets this obscurity as an 
inaccessible hidden truth, and it constitutes itself relative to this otherness, 
which leaves it enthralled to what it doesn’t know.  As Hegel points out in 
the Philosophy of History, “The unfree spirit knows truth only as something 
‘over there.’  The spirit that is free is spirit for itself, is not in the presence of 
something other.”4 The unfree subject remains hypnotized by the spell of what 
it doesn’t know.  But overcoming this spell requires more than simply conjuring 
it away.  History, as Hegel understands it, is the unraveling of this image, the 
series of revelations in which an apparently substantial Other manifests its 
lack of independence and thus its lack of authority.  Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History doesn’t show a progressive development of authority but its dialectical 
dismantling until the subject is left with nothing but its freedom.  
 Freedom doesn’t just appear to the subject at some arbitrary point in 
time.  Subjects discover their freedom through the recognition that occurs when 
what they took for a substantial authority reveals itself as insubstantial.  This 
recognition happens again and again throughout history, as each successive 
figure of supposed substantial authority reveals its absence of self-identity.  
As subjects experience the failure of one authority after another, they gain 
increasing purchase on their freedom because they realize that there is no Other 
that is whole, and this is what Hegel chronicles happening throughout history.  
And finally Hegel arrives to punctuate the fundamental insubstantiality that 
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gives the subject absolute freedom.  
 As Hegel conceives it, the death of Christ is a decisive moment in the 
unfolding of freedom.  At this point in history, the most substantial image of 
the Other that humanity has ever produced—the infinite God of monotheism 
that exists beyond the constraints that limit the physical world—identifies itself 
with a finite being in an utterly humiliated form.  The humiliation of Christ is not 
just contingent aspect of his existence.  The ignominious image of Christ on the 
cross reveals that insubstantiality of the most sublime conception of divinity, 
and this is why Hegel locates the emergence of modern freedom in Christ’s 
death.  
 The subject is free only when its substantial Other suffers abject 
humiliation without ceasing to be the expression of authority.  There is no 
freedom in one authority being toppled; another quickly replaces it, as when 
a political leader replaces a sports star or a teacher replaces a parent as the 
central authority in someone’s life.  Freedom requires the authority to lose its 
substantial status without losing its authority, so that the subject recognizes that 
the authority exists for it and through its support rather than independently.  
 We can see an instance of this freeing effect when a child sees its 
parent behave foolishly in public and endure mockery from others.  The child 
undoubtedly pities the parent, but the parent loses substantial authority through 
this humiliation.  The parent becomes a lacking figure and yet remains an 
authority at the same time.  The child gains freedom from parental authority 
in this reconfiguration of authority as still authoritative but not substantial.  
The point is not simply that authority disintegrates leaving the child on its 
own.  Instead, parental authority remains in force while losing its mysterious 
secret.  This loss enables the child to recognize the role that it has played in the 
functioning of authority.  Freedom emerges from the debris of the Other being 
deprived of its substantiality.5
 This is what Hegel sees happening in the case of Christ.  As he states in 
his discussion of religion in the Philosophy of Religion, “The highest divestment 
of the divine idea, as divestment of itself, i.e., [the idea that] is in addition this 
divestment—is expressed as follows: ‘God has died, God himself is dead.’  [This] 
is a monstrous, fearful picture, which brings before the imagination the deepest 
abyss of cleavage.”6 The cleavage that Hegel announces here occurs not 
between God and humanity but within God: it is God’s self-division.  The event 
of this self-division—Christ’s crucifixion—represents a monstrous moment for 
the believer because it strips away the idea of a substantial Other, but it is for 
this same reason also a moment of emancipation.  The subject who experiences 
the death of God through Christ’s crucifixion is a free subject, though most 
Christians retain the idea of a substantial and indecipherable God located in 
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the beyond who survives this crucifixion.  This is how the majority of Christians 
avoid the freedom that Christ’s death grants them.  
 The task of the Hegelian theorist is one of dismantling the forms that 
the substantial Other takes on as they arise.  Though Christianity reveals the 
substantiality of God as a divided subject through the death of Christ, the idea 
of a substantial Other does not die so easily.  It doesn’t just have to be defeated 
twice like Napoleon but time and time again.  Though the unknowable God 
is the most intractable form of the substantial Other, this figure nonetheless 
proliferates in many other guises in the contemporary world.  We posit it in the 
secrets of the natural world, the desires of the terrorist, or even the innocence of 
the child.  Substance is the secret truth that we believe that we cannot know.  
 What we posit as an epistemological barrier functions ipso facto as a 
barrier to our freedom.  Though there will always be gaps in our knowledge, 
these gaps do not contain a hidden truth.  The idea that what we don’t know is a 
truth that we are missing obscures the internal limit through which our freedom 
constitutes itself.  Hegel insists on absolute knowledge—that is to say, the idea 
that there is no hidden truth in what we don’t know, even though there is always 
something we don’t know—in order to articulate our freedom.  The subject 
who rejects absolute knowledge and believes in an ultimate truth that exists 
elsewhere rejects its freedom through this gesture.  Freedom depends on not 
believing in the substantiality of the Other and on recognizing that every Other 
is in the same existential bind as the subject itself.  
The State of Freedom 
 For thinkers prior to Hegel, the state is a necessary interruption of the 
subject’s freedom and an interruption of the potential war of all against all that 
would transpire without it.  This is the position of both Rousseau and Hobbes, 
who see the state as the result of an implicit contract arranged by individual 
subjects to protect their interests.  Hegel vehemently opposes this notion of the 
state as contractual, a notion that obscures the foundational role that state plays 
in the freedom of the subject.  With Hegel the state becomes identical with the 
subject’s freedom, and this freedom disappears without the universal structure 
of the state as its correlate.  The state is the basis for freedom because it reveals 
to the subject the necessity of the contingent obstacle for this freedom to 
constitute itself.7
 When the individual subject conceives itself without reference to the state, 
it conceives itself as a being of pure self-interest.  One can imagine the subject 
pursuing its self-interest, but the problem is that this pursuit is not freedom.  
The subject’s interests—even up to its interest in its own survival—are given to 
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it by the society and the natural world in which the subject emerges.  Hence, as 
Hegel sees it, self-interest has nothing to do with the subject’s freedom, which 
depends on the subject alienating itself from the interests that society and 
nature have given it.  The free subject alienates itself from its own givens, and 
the state is the vehicle for making this alienation explicit to the subject, which is 
why Hegel insists on it so vehemently.  It is only through identifying itself with 
the state that the subject recognizes that its freedom does not lie in the pursuit 
of its self-interest but rather in the uprooting of that pursuit.  
 But the state doesn’t just alienate an isolated subject.  It provides a 
shared obstacle for all the subjects that belong to it, and this shared obstacle 
holds them together as a unity.  Subjects come together in the state not as an 
organic whole or an aggregate but as an alienated unity.  They are held together 
through a shared way of being what they are not.  
 Hegel’s celebration of the state in the Philosophy of Right has proven 
the most ignominious aspect of his philosophy since the book’s appearance in 
1821.  Soon after its publication, it became the emblem of Hegel’s conformity 
to the Prussian monarchy in power at the time.8  It signaled his refusal to use 
his privileged position as one of the most important philosophers in Germany 
to challenge authority rather than suck up to it.  Even though many disciples 
of Hegel have debunked this interpretation of the Philosophy of Right as an 
exercise in conformity, it has resonated due to Hegel’s unconditional embrace 
of the state, which cannot but strike modern readers as a dangerous moment of 
capitulation that we would like to strike from Hegel’s political philosophy.
 But to excise the state from Hegel’s thought would be to mutilate it 
beyond recognition.  The embrace of the state is not a moment of conformity 
that Hegel might have avoided but the basis on which he constructs his idea 
of freedom.  As he grants the state a central role in the Philosophy of Right, 
Hegel puts the finishing touch on his philosophy of freedom that begins with 
the Phenomenology of Spirit.  This completes the turn from Kant’s subjectivist 
freedom (where Hegel begins) to an objective form, from freedom as pure 
negativity to freedom as a positive expression of this negativity.  As Shlomo 
Avineri puts it in Hegel and the Modern State, “subjectivist philosophy has made 
it a rule to see freedom only in opposition to the state, overlooking what is to 
Hegel the immanent truth of the state as the actuality of rational freedom.”9 The 
state actualizes freedom through making the obstacle to self-interest explicit.  
When the subject recognizes its essential link to the state, it also recognizes that 
its satisfaction doesn’t lie down the path of self-interest.  
 The great danger of modernity is not a powerful state that impinges 
on individual freedom but the failure to recognize the state as a state and to 
mistake civil society for it.  In civil society, individuals benefit the whole by 
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following their self-interest, such as when the baker profits from selling bread 
and the customer survives by eating it.  The baker doesn’t bake for the sake 
of the customer, and the customer doesn’t buy bread to support the baker.  
Instead, the pursuit of self-interest benefits the whole and unites both parties.10
 Because economy dominates politics to such an extent in modernity, 
we risk falling into the trap of thinking that the state is nothing more than civil 
society, in which shared self-interest unites us.  In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
articulates his fear of this development.  He writes, 
If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is 
equated with the security and protection of property and personal 
freedom, the interest of individuals as such becomes the ultimate end 
for which they are united; it also follows from this that membership of 
the state is an optional matter. – But the relationship of the state to 
the individual is of a quite different kind.  Since the state is objective 
spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual 
himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life.11 
As capitalism has developed since Hegel wrote this, civil society has increasingly 
encroached on the state and placed its own logic over that of the state, so that 
subjects have completely fallen for the ruse that the state is nothing but the 
guardian of mutual self-interest.  The danger that Hegel foresaw in 1821 has 
come to fruition.12 
 The more the state appears as an optional encumbrance, the more the 
subject loses touch with its freedom.  Since the state restricts what the subject 
can do—it passes laws against theft, against drunk driving, and against other 
enjoyable activities—it seems as if the state has an oppositional relationship 
to the subject’s freedom.  But this form of appearance is the key to the state’s 
revelatory power.  The state’s restrictiveness has a heuristic function and shows 
the subject that it asserts its freedom only when it accepts a fundamental 
alienation from what serves its self-interest.  
 The state is the center of power, and identification of the subject’s 
freedom with this power risks association with state sponsored violence—
not just wars and executions but the implicit violence in existing social 
arrangements.  When he foregrounds the necessity of the state for the subject’s 
freedom, Hegel understands the risks involved.  But without the state or some 
equivalent nonsensical signifier demanding identification, the subject could not 
be free.  The freedom of the subject is an achievement of modernity, and it is 
not by accident that modernity frees the subject from the despotic authority of 
tradition that had formerly characterized subjectivity.  Hegel identifies with the 
authority of the state as the foundation of the subject’s freedom.  
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Why We Don’t Remain in the Provinces 
 Hegel’s critique of the freedom of pure negativity has an analogue with 
a key decision in his life, and it provides an instructive contrast with Martin 
Heidegger, who faced a similar decision and made the opposite choice.  Hegel 
spent ten years of his philosophical career on the outside of the German 
university system, working first as a newspaper editor and then as a Gymnasium 
rector rather than teaching philosophy at a major university.  Hegel never 
romanticized this outsider position, and through the publication of the Science 
of Logic and the Encyclopedia, he worked to make himself more attractive for a 
university post.  He eventually gained a position at the University of Heidelberg 
in 1816, which led to the call to Humboldt University in Berlin, which he accepted. 
Hegel started teaching in this prestigious post in 1817.  
 Hegel’s move from provincial newspaper editor to philosophy professor 
at the center of the German university system was a move from the margin to 
the center.  When he published the first part of his most important book (the 
Science of Logic) in 1812, Hegel was an anonymous gymnasium rector in the 
provinces.  But when he suddenly died in 1831, he was on the top of the German 
philosophical world.  His thought became the standard against which all other 
philosophical systems constituted themselves.  
 Hegel accepts the call to Berlin because he wants to disseminate his 
philosophy of freedom, and Berlin offers him the largest stage for doing so.  By 
accepting a position at the center of German intellectual life, Hegel exemplifies 
his own conception of freedom.  Freedom does not consist in fighting against 
some dominant external power but in recognizing that the subject must provide 
the ground for its own act.  When one becomes the supreme philosophical 
authority in Germany, one recognizes the insubstantiality of this authority 
because its self-division is directly evident.  Of course, one can come to this 
recognition without actually becoming the supreme philosophical authority, but 
refusing this position and clinging to an outsider status would have the effect of 
sustaining the image of authority’s substantiality.  Had Hegel refused the call to 
Berlin because he didn’t want to compromise himself with the center of power, 
he would have violated his own philosophy of freedom, which requires such 
compromises to make itself actual.  
 Hegel’s vision of freedom is certainly possible in the provinces, but it 
prohibits the philosopher from fetishizing the provinces.  Insisting on distance 
from the center of power or maintaining one’s marginality misleads us into 
constructing a philosophy of opposition, which is, for Hegel, the great danger.  
When we create a philosophy of opposition, we necessarily posit a substantial 
authority in the Other that we oppose and, in this way, fail to recognize 
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ourselves as free.  For philosophical reasons, Hegel has to accept the call to 
Berlin, and this places him in direct opposition to Heidegger, who receives a 
similar call a little over a century later.  
 Just as Hegel’s acceptance of the call to Berlin offers a personal analogue 
for his conception of freedom, Heidegger’s refusal does the same, and 
unfortunately, the prevailing conception of freedom today is much closer to 
Heidegger’s than it is to Hegel’s.  When it comes to the decision to move to the 
center or remain in the margin, Heidegger made the contemporary decision.  
In contrast to Hegel, he opted to remain at the University of Freiburg amid 
the Black Forest and refused to heed the call to Berlin that Hegel so eagerly 
accepted.  Leaving his Nazism aside, this decision seems to place Heidegger 
on higher ethical ground than Hegel.  He chose slow country life where he was 
able to spend time thinking and interacting with everyday neighbors rather 
than hobnobbing with political leaders and famous writers.  In short, being a 
philosopher was more important for Heidegger than being recognized as a 
philosopher, which is what would draw one to Berlin.  
 In his defense of the decision to remain in the provinces, Heidegger points 
out how life at an intellectual hub has a distorting effect on one’s thought.  He 
writes, “In the public world one can be made a ‘celebrity’ overnight by the 
newspapers and journals.  That always remains the surest way to have one’s 
ownmost intentions get misinterpreted and quickly and thoroughly forgotten.”13   
During the years that have passed since Heidegger made this pronouncement, 
the distorting effect of the cult of celebrity has multiplied exponentially.  Today, 
even the retreat into his little hut in Todtnauberg could not keep Heidegger safe 
from international attention.  Fame reaches everywhere, and even philosophers 
are not immune today to becoming celebrities in a way that would have been 
unthinkable in Heidegger’s time.14 
 In today’s intellectual universe, there is much more critique leveled against 
Heidegger’s politics than Hegel’s.  This is due not to the time that Heidegger 
spent at his hut in retreat from the world but to the moments when he ventured 
out.  Though Heidegger resisted the call to Berlin, he did not refuse the 
opportunity to become the rector of the University of Freiburg after the Nazis 
came to power in 1933.  As rector and as Nazi party member, Heidegger openly 
identified himself with figures of authority.  If Heidegger had simply remained 
at his hut in Todtnauberg and continued to philosophize about the dangers of 
modernity, he would have eliminated avant la lettre almost all criticism of his 
politics.  But in a sense, the rectorship and the public engagement associated 
with it represent Heidegger’s attempt to articulate a positive form of freedom.  
It fails because he found the image of rebellion too attractive to resist, and 
rebellion fundamentally shaped the form that his public engagement took.
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 It is the same impulse that led Heidegger to reject the call to Berlin that 
also moved him in the direction of Nazism.  He saw in Nazism a rebellion against 
modernity, and this spirit of rebellion enthralls Heidegger.  He sees modernity 
as the ruling authority that contemporary philosophy must contest.  In the 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger offers a clear portrait of the danger 
confronting Europe that Nazism promises to defeat.  He writes, “Russia and 
America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of 
unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man.”15   
Against this onslaught of enforced conformity coming from both east and west, 
Nazism, as Heidegger conceives it, offers the possibility of preserving what 
doesn’t fit in modernity—like a philosopher in a hut in the Black Forest.  
 The contrast between Hegel and Heidegger is a contrast between two 
competing ideas of freedom.  Hegel’s freedom has its basis in the absence of 
any basis.  That is to say, we discover our freedom at the moment when we 
discover that the Other has no substance, that what we don’t know doesn’t hold 
any secret truths.  Our freedom relates to an obstacle, but this is our freedom’s 
own obstacle—an internal stumbling block.  The subject realizes Hegel’s form of 
freedom through the abandonment of pure negativity and the acceptance of the 
subject’s self-limitation. 
 For Heidegger, the free subject does not follow along with the crowd.  The 
crowd is anathema, but at the same time, Heidegger requires the everydayness 
of the crowd (what he calls das Man or the they) in order to constitute his 
freedom in relation to.  The they must play the role of the villain in Heidegger’s 
thought, and freedom exists through the overcoming of this villain.  Hegel’s 
conception of freedom, in contrast, internalizes the villain.  He can go to 
Berlin because he recognizes that the opposition that animates freedom will 
accompany him there.  Hegel’s freedom doesn’t require an external villain 
because this form of freedom always brings its own villain along with it.  
Hegel’s Aftermath 
 In the wake of Hegel’s exploration of freedom as the positive 
manifestation of negativity, two thinkers emerged to challenge directly this 
conception of freedom.  They located freedom in the pure negativity of 
history’s victims and in the marginalized of history—in the proletariat and in the 
individual.  For Karl Marx and Søren Kierkegaard, Hegel’s philosophy of freedom 
represents a circumscribed conception of freedom that they make more 
inclusive.  But while doing this, they reintroduce a substantial Other that has the 
effect of obviating the subject’s freedom that Hegel discovers.  
 From our perspective, it is almost impossible not to look on Marx and 
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Kierkegaard collectively as an advance on Hegel.  Their expansion of freedom 
seems much more appropriate to modernity than Hegel’s less radical version, 
and, in clear contrast to Hegel, they both give us something to do.  Hegel’s 
freedom involves nothing but a change of perspective—seeing oneself in 
absolute otherness or, in other words, recognizing the insubstantiality of the 
Other.  Marx and Kierkegaard impel us toward political revolution and the leap 
of faith, and these parallel gestures move us toward absolute otherness rather 
than simply adopting a different perspective on it.  
 But it is because they give us something to do that we should think 
twice before going beyond Hegel to Marx and Kierkegaard.  To be sure, the 
proletarian revolution and the leap of faith evince more activity that Hegel’s 
theoretical arrival at the absolute idea.  But they both represent a philosophical 
retreat from Hegel’s conception of freedom.  In their own specific ways, Marx 
and Kierkegaard reinstall the image of a substantial Other, and this is why we 
should be skeptical of the advance on Hegel that they offer.  
 Marx’s great achievement involves the revelation that substance is subject 
in the capitalist economy.  Capitalism appeals to its adherents because profit 
appears substantial, the result of a magical process in which the savvy capitalist 
buys low and sells high.  In volume 3 of Capital, Marx introduces subjectivity into 
this equation in the form of the appropriation of surplus value.  As Marx grasps, 
profit appears substantial only because we don’t readily see that the production 
and appropriation of surplus value that generate profit.  Once we recognize this 
substance (profit) as subject (the appropriation of surplus value), it loses its 
hold over us, and we can escape the reign of the capitalist economy in which 
profit has the last word.  
 But Marx’s investment in freedom is not as thoroughgoing as that of 
Hegel, and he reintroduces a substantial Other when he turns from economics 
to politics.  Marx shrouds his vision of the communist future in silence.  He offers 
only a few vague descriptions of what life in this future will be like, although he 
does characterize it as a realm of freedom, which seems appealing.  Toward the 
end of volume 3 of Capital, he differentiates between the economic realm of 
necessity and the realm of freedom that exists after the means of production 
have met all needs.  He writes, “The true realm of freedom, the development 
of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond [the realm of necessity], 
though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis.  The 
reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite.”16  Here Marx ensconces 
freedom in an absolute beyond, and it is not at all surprising that he does not go 
on to describe this realm of freedom.  It is by definition beyond description and 
unknown, and this gives it the status of a substantial Other.  Marx substantializes 
freedom in the form of a future to be realized, and in doing so he falls victim to 
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the precise trap that Hegel works to avoid throughout his philosophical system.  
At no point does Hegel point toward an unknown future in which things will be 
better as Marx does.  Operating with this image of the future anchors the subject 
and provides a guide wire for its actions, and this represents an abandonment of 
the subject’s freedom, which is also what occurs with Kierkegaard.
 The substantial Other in the case of Kierkegaard is more subtle.  In 
many ways, Kierkegaard, despite his rabid opposition to Hegel, formulates a 
very Hegelian philosophy that identifies dialectical moments in the structure 
of belief.17  But Kierkegaard refuses Hegel’s interpretation of Christ’s death.  
For Kierkegaard, God remains utterly distinct from the world of finitude.  The 
humiliation of Christ in the finite world does not manifest God’s descent or 
desubstantialization.  The danger, as he articulates it in Judge for Yourself!, is 
believing that “the unconditioned … merges with the conditioned.”18  This is 
an impossibility that would eliminate the infinite distance that separates the 
subject from God, but it becomes everyday theology in the Christendom that 
Kierkegaard excoriates.  This infinite distance is correlative to the subject’s 
freedom.  Kierkegaard poses it in opposition in opposition to Hegelian absolute 
knowing as the emblem of this freedom.  
 The subject’s freedom, for Kierkegaard, depends on an absence of 
knowledge about God, who thus acquires a substantial status.  Kierkegaard’s 
critique of Hegel focuses on how the latter fails to grasp his own inability, as a 
finite subject, to know God.19  We can have access to God, but this access is only 
indirect, which is why Christianity requires the leap of faith on the part of the 
subject.  Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard gives the subject a task—accomplish the leap 
and become an authentic Christian—but the cost of this task is prohibitive.  
 Even though Kierkegaard emphasizes that the existing individual is free to 
accept Christ or not, he stacks the deck through his characterization of God.  No 
matter how often Kierkegaard proclaims that the individual experiences anxiety 
in her or his freedom, even this anxiety becomes reassuring because God 
regains a substantial status in his philosophy (that was lost with Hegel).  This 
becomes clear in The Concept of Anxiety, when he states, “Anxiety is freedom’s 
possibility, and only such anxiety is through faith absolutely educative, because 
it consumes all finite ends and discovers all their deceptiveness.”20  Anxiety is 
not the horror of experiencing no ground for my freedom (as it would be for 
Hegel); instead, it has a pedagogical effect on the subject and teaches it the 
insufficiency of all finite options.  The subject benefits from anxiety, according to 
Kierkegaard’s schema, because it attests to the substantiality of God in relation 
to the subject unsubstantial ends.  This is Kierkegaard’s version of Marx’s retreat 
from Hegelian freedom.  
 Both Marx and Kierkegaard denude Hegel’s philosophy of freedom.  They 
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balk at the evisceration of all substance that Hegel accomplishes and reimagine 
it in new forms.  However much sympathy we might feel for the proletariat 
and the individual, the philosophies that champion them end up abandoning 
freedom in their attempt to correct Hegel’s theorization of it.
Contemporary Hegelians 
 In the last half of the twentieth century, an effort to cut Hegel in two 
began.  In this endeavor, theorists warmly greeted the Hegel of the negative 
while criticizing the Hegel of positive reconciliation.  From this perspective 
(which enjoyed widespread theoretical acceptance), the Hegel of the negative 
is the politically tenable Hegel, and he stands opposed to the triumphant Hegel.  
Though Hegel concludes his philosophy by finally abandoning the restlessness 
of the negative for the security of an endpoint, he nonetheless reveals in what 
comes before how the negative both disturbs and constitutes every positive 
identity.  Hegel was the first philosopher to give the negative its due, and this 
marks his enduring theoretical value, according to this position.  
 In each of Hegel’s major works, the negative or nothing plays the 
central role in the unfolding of the philosophy.  His definitive statement on the 
philosophical significance of the negative comes early in his first major work.  In 
the preface to the The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel announces that the task 
of spirit “only wins to its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder” and when 
it “looks the negative in the face and tarries with it.”21  So far, so good.  Just on 
the basis of these lines, it is difficult to imagine a more enthusiastic champion of 
the negative in philosophy.  The negative is the birthplace of subjectivity and the 
smithy in which its truth forms.  Hegel’s embrace of the negative here resonates 
throughout twentieth century philosophy.
 The emphasis on the Hegel of the negative dominates his reception in the 
twentieth century reception, and the thinker who does the most to shape this 
reception is undoubtedly Alexandre Kojève.  In his influential lectures on Hegel, 
Kojève argues that he conceives of human existence as essentially negative or 
negating.  He claims, “Man is negating Action, which transforms given Being 
and transforms itself by transforming it.”22  To say, as Kojève does, that human 
essence is a process of negating is to say that there is no human essence—or at 
least no positive quality that would constitute this essence.  
 Like most who follow in his wake, Kojève separates Hegel’s negativity 
from the moment in the system when all negativity dialectically becomes 
positive.  But Kojève, unlike those coming after him, does not dismiss or critique 
the abandonment of negativity that occurs in Hegel’s thought.  For Kojève, this 
ultimate victory of positivity over negativity—the end of history—is inevitable, 
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though he vacillated on the time frame of negativity’s demise.23  While Kojève’s 
insistence upon Hegelian negativity has largely directed the course of thought 
about Hegel in the latter half of the twentieth century, his embrace of Hegel’s 
idea of an end, a final accounting in which negativity reaches a positive 
conclusion, has made itself felt only in its abeyance.24
 Rather than seeing negativity as eventually reconciled into the structures 
of positivity, rather than seeing history as coming to an end, most recent 
theorists view negativity as irreconcilable, as eternal.  Hegel was right, so this 
thinking goes, to stress the negative, but he didn’t go far enough.  In abandoning 
the negative in the last instance, Hegel jumped from critique to capitulation.25 
Hegel begins on the right path, but he deviates too soon, abandoning the 
negative and thereby abandoning that which has been left behind.  The task 
for theorists coming in Hegel’s wake consists in extending negativity and 
attempting to refuse the turn to the positive, because it is this ultimate turn 
to the positive that places Hegel in league with the winners and the insiders in 
history.  To abandon the negative, from this perspective, is to abandon one’s 
freedom.  
 This line of thought finds its apotheosis in Theodor Adorno, who embodies 
the split attitude toward Hegel as no one else does.  Hegel’s great achievement, 
according to Adorno, is his negativity, his critical spirit.  It is this negativity 
that draws him to Hegel despite the latter’s ultimate abandonment of it.  In his 
book on Hegel, Adorno makes clear that his high estimation of Hegel stems 
from precisely this focus.  He writes, “Hegel’s philosophy is indeed essentially 
negative: critique.”26  Here Adorno seems an unabashed fan of Hegel for his 
devotion to negativity, a devotion that Adorno himself emulates throughout 
his own philosophy.  But in the end, this devotion requires leaving Hegel by 
the side of the road because Hegel doesn’t sustain his fidelity to negativity.  
Adorno adds, “By specifying, in opposition to Hegel, the negativity of the whole, 
philosophy satisfies, for the last time, the postulate of determinate negation, 
which is a positing.  The ray of light that reveals the whole to be untrue in all 
its moments is none other than utopia, the utopia of the whole truth, which is 
still to be realized.”27  Adorno’s project continually stresses the persistence of 
negativity, its ability to haunt every positive formation, but Hegel ultimately 
concludes with the whole, in which every negativity becomes subsumed.  
 To Adorno’s way of thinking, the systematic whole belies the radicality of 
the dialectical method.  While Adorno celebrates Hegelian negativity, Hegel’s 
system becomes untruth because it insists on the truth of the whole, thereby 
joining the side of history’s winners.  Hence, Hegel’s error lies in his failure to 
take critique far enough and to see negativity even in the seemingly positive 
whole itself.  Proclaiming the falsity of the whole is Adorno’s way of maintaining 
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the critical spirit that Hegel too quickly abandons for an embrace of—and 
a justification for—the world as it exists.28  Adorno’s critique of the ultimate 
failure of critique in Hegel represents the prevailing theoretical view.  Adorno is 
exemplary because he commits himself so thoroughly to opposition.  Freedom is 
questioning, not conforming.  
 Adorno at least credits Hegel with abandoning the negative.  Other more 
recent theorists simply dismiss whatever in Hegel’s thought doesn’t match their 
vision of Hegelian negativity.  The exemplar of this strategy is Jean-Luc Nancy.  
In Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, he aligns Hegel’s philosophy with 
unbridled negativity and negativity with freedom.  In a statement interpreting 
Hegel’s philosophy, Nancy asserts, “Freedom is the position of negativity as 
such.”29  The idea of an endpoint in Hegel’s thought, a point at which negativity 
reaches a conclusion, has no place in Nancy’s interpretation.  From Nancy’s 
perspective, Hegel becomes the philosopher of permanent resistance, which is 
the privileged theoretical position today.30
 The problem with the insistence on the negative is that this position blinds 
itself to its dependence on what it opposes.  Hegel conceives every negation 
as a determinate negation and thus as a positive assertion in order to avoid the 
hidden dependence of pure negativity.  If I oppose the corruption of the political 
system, for instance, my negation requires the corruption that it negates.  When 
the corruption disappears, so does my negating subjectivity, which is why pure 
negativity secretly preserves what it opposes.  This is not to say, of course, that 
the theorist cannot oppose corruption but just that this opposition must include 
a positive determination of its negativity.  
  Kojève, Adorno, Nancy, and all the other partisans of the negative Hegel 
create a more palatable Hegel.  But by extrapolating the negative Hegel from 
the affirmative one, they transform the outspoken critic of philosophical hysteria 
into a hysterical philosopher.  For Hegel, there is no freedom in simply negating.  
Doing so resuscitates the substantiality of the Other that his entire philosophy 
undermines.  The attempt to purify Hegel has the effect of dismantling his 
philosophy of freedom.  If we want freedom, we cannot confine ourselves to 
negating—which is to say, we cannot simply spend our time in rebellion.31
Confederate Flags Everywhere 
 The ideal ego of the modern subject is that of the rebel.  Even if the 
subject’s rebellion is nothing but the guise for a thoroughgoing conformity, 
the subject clings to it feverishly because it enables the subject to navigate the 
contradictory imperatives that characterize modernity.  The image of the rebel 
connotes freedom and self-determination, a refusal to conform to the demands 
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of authority, which is what modernity calls for.  But while adopting this ideal 
ego, one can at the same time follow authority’s demands without avowing this 
conformity to oneself.  As just an image, rebellion doesn’t require acting without 
the security of an authority figure.  One has the security of authority without the 
embarrassment of open conformity.
 Hegel’s philosophical project aims to strip away this ideal ego from the 
modern subject.  As he sees it, this image disguises the subject’s freedom 
and causes the subject to misrecognize its relation to authority.  It creates a 
subject incapable of performing a transformative act who nonetheless remains 
convinced of its own radicality.  By demolishing this image that holds sway over 
the modern subject, Hegel makes his contribution to the project of freedom, the 
project that he identifies with history itself.
 The rebel is an insider who experiences existence as an outsider.  This 
paradox holds the key to the attractiveness of the position.  Whenever one 
would pin the rebel down to a specific position, she or he is always elsewhere, 
on the outside of this position.  In this way, the rebel’s freedom remains a 
negative freedom that has no positive identity.  The rebel is free and never 
complicit.  
 Despite his marginal status in the recent theoretical landscape, the 
paradigmatic thinker of rebellion is Albert Camus.  His work devoted to it is 
entitled L’homme revolté (translated as The Rebel), and this book inadvertently 
demonstrates the danger that the ideal ego of the rebel poses to the freedom 
of the modern subject.  It is not an accident that the great apostle of freedom 
in the twentieth century, Jean-Paul Sartre, went out of his way to denounce 
this book and break with his former friend over its publication.  Though Camus 
doesn’t have many disciples today, his conception of rebellion implicitly informs 
the investment in resistance that proliferates throughout the contemporary 
theoretical universe.
 In The Rebel, Camus takes pains to dissociate himself from the winners in 
history and to side with the losers.  This is, according to Camus, what it means 
to embrace the philosophical stance of rebellion.  The tendency to rebellion 
manifests itself philosophically (in rebellion against the human condition and 
against God) and historically (in rebellion against concrete domination).  In both 
cases, the urge to rebel, the urge to struggle against an unbeatable opponent, 
demonstrates humanity at its best.  Revolt has value because, for Camus, it 
embodies the subject’s freedom.  To rebel is to reject domination—either the 
domination of God or of a human master—and not simultaneously to participate 
in domination oneself.  Herein also lies the difficulty in sustaining rebellion and 
why, ultimately, it is always doomed to failure in Camus’s eyes.  If rebellion 
were to win—which is to say, if it were to become a successful rebellion—then it 
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would cease to be rebellion and would lose its link to freedom.  If rebellion wins, 
it becomes revolution, and revolution necessarily leads to a conformity that the 
rebel avoids.
 As Camus sees it, the thinker guiltiest of betraying rebellion is Hegel, 
who was also the first to grasp rebellion’s importance.  The betrayal consists 
in Hegel’s insistence that the winner is always right, an idea that Camus sees 
present not just in the final affirmation of the absolute, but even in the dialectic 
of the master and the slave.  Though he attacks those who would completely 
dismiss Hegel’s important contribution to the thought of rebellion, Camus 
nonetheless renders a damning verdict in the end.  He writes, “Hegel … furnished, 
on the level of the dialectic of master and slave, the decisive justification of the 
spirit of power in the twentieth century.  The conqueror is always right; that 
is one of the lessons which can be learned from the most important German 
philosophical system of the nineteenth century.”32  Oddly enough, Camus locates 
the idea that “the conqueror is always right” in the dialectic of the master and 
slave (chapter 4 of the Phenomenology), where Hegel shows, in no uncertain 
terms, that it is the conquered, rather than the conqueror, who is “right.”  
 This profound misreading is doubly significant for its error.  It is not just, 
as Jean-Paul Sartre claimed, that Camus hadn’t bothered to read Hegel before 
attacking him, but that his commitment to rebellion utterly conditions his 
reading.  For Camus, Hegel’s great error—and he can find this error anywhere 
in Hegel, even in passages that seem most opposed to it—lies in Hegel’s 
abandonment of negativity for a positive form of freedom.
 For critics Jean-Paul Sartre and Francis Jeanson (who wrote the initial 
negative review of The Rebel in Les Temps Modernes), Camus’s mistake lies in 
his allergy to revolutionary victory and in his allegiance to rebellious struggle.  
But neither Sartre nor Jeanson grasp why Camus rejects revolutionary victory.  
Camus transforms hysteria into a political and philosophical principle.  In the 
face of what Camus considers an absurd world, the subject seemingly has no 
substantial Other to serve as a ground for its freedom.  Rebellion is a strategy 
for reconstituting the substantiality of the Other in the modern world.  This is 
why Hegel sees such a danger to freedom in the development of the rebel as 
modernity’s ideal ego.  
 The rebel always has a substantial Other in the form of the authority that 
the rebel struggles against.  This authority is substantial because it remains an 
authority even as its form undergoes a series of complete transformations.  It 
doesn’t matter what form the external authority has: external authority as such 
will endure.  The struggle will go on, and freedom will never have to manifest 
itself in a positive form.  The rebel never has to see how her or his resistance 
manifests itself without what it resists.  Rebellion provides the comfort of being 
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on the outside while imagining that there is a substantial enemy on the other 
side.
We Ought Not Invoke Ought 
 Kantian morality is another version of rebellion that never takes a positive 
form.  By definition, one never fully achieves one’s status as a Kantian moral 
subject.  For Hegel, this is the profound limitation that besets Kant’s position and 
that finally renders it untenable for him.  And yet, Kant does make a significant 
advance: the revolution of Kantian morality is that it locates freedom within the 
law rather than in the law’s transgression.  According to Kant, the fact that the 
subject gives itself laws functions paradoxically as an index of its freedom.  In 
the act of giving itself a moral law, the subject declares its freedom either to 
obey this law or not to.  Even recognizing a law as a law indicates the subject’s 
freedom from the givens of its being insofar as it suggests that the subject could 
act otherwise.  This capacity for acting otherwise emerges with the formulation 
and recognition of the law.  
 The law arrives from the subject itself, according to Kant, even though 
the subject experiences the law as an external constraint.  The law does not first 
come from outside and then become internalized by the subject; instead, the 
subject’s act of giving the law to itself renders it capable of accepting external 
laws.  Kant does not view the existence of the law as part of the subject’s 
ideological manipulation but as the sign that such manipulation must pass 
through the subject’s freedom.  
 Though Hegel finds much to criticize about Kantian morality, he stops to 
admire the radicality of the moral revolution that Kant inaugurates toward the 
end of his History of Philosophy.  He recognizes that the decisive step forward 
that Kant makes lies in linking morality to freedom rather than to constraint, 
which is how we typically conceive morality.  In his discussion of Kant, Hegel 
states, “there is no other end for the will than the one created out of the will 
itself, the goal of its own freedom.  The establishment of this principle was a 
great advance; human freedom is the ultimate pivot upon which humanity turns, 
the ultimate and absolutely firm pinnacle that is not open to influence, such that 
we grant validity to nothing, to no authority of whatever form, if it goes against 
human freedom.”33  Hegel grants that Kant doesn’t just postulate but actually 
proves the subject’s freedom and that he does so through the moral law, just as 
he says.  
 Kant makes what Hegel calls a “great advance,” but his conception of the 
moral law as what the subject ought to do rather than what the subject already 
does marks his fundamental misstep.  By aligning his philosophical position with 
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the ought (Sollen), Kant distances himself from moral success.  The Kantian 
subject constantly struggles to act morally but never fully does so.  Morality 
consists of striving toward moral action, and the incessant failures of the subject 
force Kant to posit the subject’s immortality in order to allow this striving to 
continue.  Because the subject defines itself through unending striving, death 
does not represent a genuine barrier.  
 Fichte makes the ought of Kantian morality into the basis of his entire 
philosophical system.  The problem with this is that striving after the good 
replaces the act.  Kantian and Fichtean subjects avoid acting, according 
to Hegel, because when they do, “they enter the sphere of limitedness.  
They foresee this and therefore fear every contact, remain enclosed within 
themselves, and revere their inner infinitude.”34  Kantian and Fichtean freedom 
has the paradoxical effect of creating a subject unable to act.  
 Kant and Fichte’s version of morality is that of the rebel.  Though they 
align morality with the law rather than with its transgression, they fail to take 
their realignment far enough.  Hegel pushes the realignment a step further.  By 
identifying ourselves with the achievement of the moral law rather than striving 
to achieve it, we reveal that freedom is not the absence of limitation but the 
encounter with an internal limitation that drives us to act.  
 We should not think of Hegel’s philosophy as a rejection of Kantian 
morality but as the absolute development of it.  Kant and Fichte correctly grasp 
that the subject realizes its freedom in the act of giving itself the law, but they 
fail to see that this act itself is sufficient.  They believe that there is something 
more to morality, a fulfillment of moral perfection that the subject is yet to 
achieve.  This hysterical view of morality always leaves the subject on this side 
of moral probity, and in doing so, it creates a moral paralysis.  The Kantian and 
Fichtean subject aims at moral perfection and in this way misses the opportunity 
for the garden-variety ethical act, an act accomplished by compromising one’s 
morality with actuality.  
Compromised Resistance 
 
 Compromise is often the manifestation of opportunism.  One resorts to 
compromise instead of taking a principled stand and fighting for one’s position 
because one doesn’t really have a position to fight for.  While most compromise 
undoubtedly suffers from the taint of opportunism, every practical political 
activist knows that compromise is nonetheless necessary.  In addition to being 
critical of the institutions of power, one must see the institutions themselves 
as the expression of freedom.  Compromise with institutions of power doesn’t 
simply represent an abandonment of conviction; it also represents a fulfillment 
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of it: an uncompromised idea is an unrealized idea.35
 Though practical activists necessarily school themselves in the importance 
of compromise, theorists do not.  For the theorist, pure uncompromising 
negativity is always a more comfortable position.  This position guards one 
against complicity with murderers—not just Heidegger’s with Hitler, but Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s with Stalin, Alain Badiou’s with Pol Pot, and so on.  It seems that 
every time a theorist abandons pure resistance for a compromise with a positive 
political position, this is a decision that the theorist will come to rue and likely 
apologize for.  
 No one will celebrate Merleau-Ponty’s defense of Stalin or Badiou’s 
defense of Pol Pot, but we should nonetheless acknowledge the importance of 
such gestures.  Though they both subsequently recognized their errors, the step 
out of pure negation to a positive embrace of a political position represents the 
task of theory.  Pure resistance has the virtue of never being wrong, but this 
also prevents it from ever being right—that is, from ever actualizing itself as a 
positive entity in the world.  This is why theory must move beyond resistance 
and identify the positive attainment of freedom.  
 Thought appears to run ahead of action, and the practical world seems 
to require time to catch up with the theoretical one.  We can imagine utopias 
that we lack the capacity for realizing, and thought gives tasks for our practical 
activity to achieve.  This vision of the relationship of thought and action holds 
for most modern philosophers, inclusive of materialists like Marx, who theorizes 
revolutionary conditions for the proletariat to act on.  But Hegel reverses the 
priority of thought and action entirely.  According to Hegel, it is not the task of 
our actions to catch up to our thoughts but for our thoughts to catch up to our 
actions.  Thought can do so because our actions are always thinking actions, 
even if unconsciously so.  
 In the light of this reversal, the theoretical privileging of resistance 
consigns theory to always remaining behind the practical activity that it 
hopes to theorize, while at the same time assuming that it runs ahead.  Pure 
negativity constructs an image of freedom that eliminates the possibility for the 
recognition of freedom as actual.  On the other hand, when one compromises 
one’s theoretical position with actuality and when one identifies positive 
formations of freedom, one is not tainting thought with the scourge of the 
real world.  Instead, through this path one elevates thought to the dignity of 
actuality.  
 Hegel pushes negativity to its ultimate point so that it loses its purity and 
manifests itself in actuality.  Without this actualization, negativity cannot serve 
as the site for freedom.  If one wants freedom, one must discover what happens 
when there are no external authorities left to fight, when the external authorities 
122
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
The End of Resistance: Hegel’s Insubstatial Freedom
appear as the mark of our freedom rather than as an obstacle to it.  The freedom 
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